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Introduction1 
In Zambia, as in many other countries going though democratic reform processes, there 
is reason to believe that a stronger ideological emphasis on constitutional democracy, 
combined with international aid towards legal and judicial reform, have strengthened 
the courts.2 Political accountability is currently regarded as a key to democratic 
consolidation in new democracies. There is an increasing focus on building and 
strengthening institutions that can create the required accountability structures, It is thus 
important to look more closely into what enables courts to fulfil such a function, and 
also to understand the limits to their role under various conditions. 3 
 
It is reasonable to assume that these developments have increased the capacity of the courts 
to contribute in processes of democratic consolidation and social transformation. But there 
is little systematic knowledge available about the role the Zambian courts actually have 
played in the political developments of the country – or about the role of other African 
courts for that matter.4 Important questions regarding the accountability function of the 
courts vis-à-vis the political authorities, their role in promoting socio-economic 
development, and their capacity to provide access to justice to marginalised groups are all 
under-researched. So are the conditions under which courts manage to generate legitimacy 
for their role, avoiding undue politicisation. 
 
The paper aims to contribute to filling some of these gaps. Not primarily by filling in data, 
but by outlining a theoretical and methodological basis for analysing the social and 
political role of courts in democratisation processes. I will focus on two related but 
analytically distinct aspects of the courts’ role: (i) the accountability functions of courts 
and (ii) their role with regard to social transformation and inclusion of marginalised 
groups. A potential consequence of an active judiciary is that the courts will be more 
politicised, and it is necessary to address this problem spesifically, and investigate 
processes of building judicial legitimacy (iii).  
 
                                                 
1 This paper reworks and builds onto the presentation “Accountability and the role of courts and 
institutions of restraint”, prepared for the conference “Analysing political processes in the context of 
multiparty elections in Zambia 2001” held i Bergen 14-15 January 2002. In reworking and developing 
these ideas I owe mujch to the discussions an input from my colleagues in the "Courts in Transition" 
research group (in particular from Roberto Gargarella, but also from Elin Skaar and Ole Egil 
Andreassen). In developing a new research programme looking into the role of the courts in processes of 
democratic consolidation and social transformation in Latin America and Africa, we have discussed these 
issues extensively. My interviews with people in and around the courts in South Africa and Tanzania have 
also been most useful. So have the longstanding collaboration with Lise Rakner, Lars Svåsand and Inge 
Amundsen on the "Polinaf" programme. 
2 In the past decades there has been a growing ideological pressure in the international community 
towards democracy in the sense of liberal, constitutional democracy, with a strong emphasis on rights 
protection and institutions to check government power, leaving courts with a more prominent role. See 
Ackerman (1997), Choudry (1999) Klug (1997) Tate and Vallinder (1997). 
3 The same holds for other accountability institutions such as human rights commissions, ombudsmen, 
anti-corruption agencies and independent electoral commissions. My focus is on the courts, but much of 
what is said here also applies at a more  general level, also to other types of accountability institution. 
4 There are partial exceptions, see for example Kunda (1998) on the Zambian judiciary; Gloppen (2000) 
and Klug (1997) on South Africa; Bukurura (1995 and 2002) on Tanzania and Namibia; and Widner 
(2001) on Tanzania and common law Africa generally. 
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Such analyses also require that we engage a number of normative questions regarding the 
role of judges in a democracy generally, and in the particular social and political context of 
Zambia. There is a need to clarify what should we should take as the 'standard' – in other 
words, which role should the Zambian judges aim for, given the constraints of their 
political and economic context? 
(i) The accountability function of courts 
Zambia, like many other African countries, have undergone processes of political and legal 
reform (with support/pressure from international donors) to establish civil, constitutional, 
democratic government, with the courts as the main guardians of the constitution and the 
rule of law. It has, however, proven difficult in practical terms to establish functioning 
boundaries for the political branches of power, in particular with regard to the President. 
The first question I want to address – and the one I will concentrate most attention of – is: 
How should we go about investigating and assessing the capacity of courts to hold 
political power-holders (particularly the executive) to account?  
 
That Zambia, like many new democracies have a weak and fragmented political opposition 
(albeit no longer one absolutely dominant political party) makes the courts' accountability 
function particularly important – a bulwark against return to authoritarian rule. How can 
we best assess the strategies used by the courts to fill this function, and the extent to which 
they have succeeded?  
 
In looking at this issue it is important to keep in mind that the idea of accountability is a 
multifaceted one. Political accountability can be defined as a situation where political 
power-holders and organs exercise their powers in a way that  
 
1) is transparent, in the sense that it enables other institutions – and the public – to see 
whether it is done in accordance with the rules,  
2) where the power-holders are answerable in the sense of being obliged to provide 
reasons for their decisions in public, and  
3) where there are institutional checks or control mechanisms in place to prevent abuse 
of power and ensure that corrective measures are taken in cases where the rules are 
violated.  
 
Each of the tree components – transparency, answerability and controllability – may 
serve as the basis for an accountability relation. This means that there are very different 
ways in which courts may serve to strengthen the accountability of power-holders. It 
can do so by aiding the information flow about how power is exercised. By demanding 
that decision-makers provide the public or the affected parties with reasons for their 
decisions to show that they acted in a reasonable and rational manner – or by 
sanctioning unlawful actions by ruling the decision null and void, or order that some 
remedial action be undertaken. 
 
The courts are part of a broader institutional set up for creating political accountability, but 
the courts have ha special responsibility since they, as guardians of the constitution, also 
have an important role in securing that other institutions have the space to fulfil their 
accountability function. 
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(ii) The role of courts in socio-economic transformation and access to justice for 
marginalised groups  
In Zambia, like elsewhere in Africa, the transition to a more democratic form of 
government has not been followed by significant changes in the social and economic 
structure of society to improve the plight of the poor majority. On the contrary, the twin 
processes of political and economic liberalisation, while bringing an increase in people's 
formal constitutional rights, have lead to a downscaling of social services – which for 
many is a downscaling in the value of their new-found liberty. 5 In this context it might 
seem as if the political opening, paradoxically, has made marginalised groups more 
dependent on the judiciary to defend their rights. The question is whether the Zambian 
courts are able and willing to take up such a role. 
 
In some countries with a similar development there have been cases where vulnerable and 
marginalised groups (squatters, poor rural communities, women, children, people living 
with HIV/AIDS, and ethnic, religious and sexual minorities) have turned to the courts to 
have their interests protected. And in some cases these groups appear to have more success 
voicing their interests through the channels of the legal system than in the political arena.6 
By analysing the strategies used by groups involved in such litigation, the extent to which 
they have been successful, and the nature of the courts’ response, it may be possible to 
understand the extent to which the legal system is able to secure the political leaders’ 
responsiveness and accountability towards the needs of poor and vulnerable groups. This – 
which – may be termed the transformative potential of the courts – is particularly relevant 
in a context like Zambia, where social transformation and development is widely 
understood to be crucial to the long-term consolidation of democracy. It is, however, also 
important to understand the political implications of fighting such battles in the legal arena. 
This brings us to the third and last issue I want to address: 
(iii) Politicisation of the courts and the foundation for judicial legitimacy 
A more central role for the courts and an increase in the scope for judicial activism has in 
some cases lead to increased politicisation of the courts, sometimes to the point of open 
conflict between political power-holders and the judiciary as witnessed most dramatically 
in Zimbabwe, and to some extent also in Malawi, Uganda, Namibia – and in Zambia.7 
 
In this context there is a need to know more about – not only the circumstances under 
which legal institutions can (and will) say ‘no’ to political power-holders, but under 
which conditions they are likely to have their authority respected. Given the significant 
international pressure for stronger and more independent courts, a pressure that in the 
case of most new and emerging democracies is backed by financial resources for 
judicial reform, it is important that we develop our understanding of the factors that 
make courts vulnerable to political influences and those that may lead to accusations of 
                                                 
5 See Dollar and Kraay (2000); Ravaillon (2002); Przeworski and Vreeland (2000). 
6 For a review of such experiences see Abramovich and Courtis (2002). See also Fabre (2000) At this 
stage the evidence of such a trend is, however, mainly anecdotal and there is a need to systematically 
investigate the prevalence of such ‘political’ and social rights cases in the courts. 
7 In some Latin American countries there have been heated public debates and demonstrations at the 
homes and offices of controversial judges, protesting their lack of independence from the executive 
branch. 
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partisanship. It is also important to examine how these tendencies can be counter-acted, 
for example through judicial strategies to establish legitimacy across a range of 
constituencies. 
The proper role of the Zambian judiciary – and why it is crucial to 
democratic consolidation  
As noted above, an analysis of the performance of judiciaries in new democracies requires 
that certain (conditional and revisable) benchmarks are established concerning what to 
look for, what the ‘success criteria’ of judicial performance are. What are the qualities that 
we, on the basis of the theoretical literature, believe are important to develop in the 
judiciary in order for it to contribute positively to democratic consolidation? 
 
In a democratic system judges should – we will argue – fulfil two main tasks, namely, to 
clear the channels of political change8 and to ensure protection to disadvantaged groups. 
This is particularly important in the context of new democracies where we often find that, 
despite reforms, the scope for political opposition is limited, and important interests are 
excluded. The judges are, according to this view, the guardians of the democratic process. 
They are the ‘referees’ in the democratic game.9 
 
While those two tasks is a crucial responsibility of judges both in modern, stable 
democracies, and in regimes that are in a process of democratisation, it seems even more 
important in the latter cases, where political institutions tend to be fragile, the boundaries 
between the branches of power less respected, and the powers of the president formally 
and informally larger than in more stable democracies – giving form to what has been 
called ‘hyper-presidentialist’ regimes.10 Regimes that are still going through a 
democratisation process tend to have weak ‘vertical’ or ‘popular’ controls, something that 
makes it particularly important to have adequate “horizontal” ones.11  
                                                 
8 ‘To clear the channels’ is to resist attempts to acquire/hold to power by illegitimate means 
(opportunistically amend the constitution, altering of election laws, gerrymandering, censorship, 
restriction of political rights etc.)  
9 In one of the most influential books written on this topic, John H. Ely affirms that the constitutional role 
of the judges is defined by what he calls a ‘representative-reinforcing approach.’ Judges should try to 
ensure the proper functioning of the Constitution. Malfunctions occur, he says, when: ‘1) the ins [elected 
representatives] are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the 
outs will stay out, or 2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an 
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced 
refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and thereby denying the minority the protection afforded 
other groups by a representative system’ Ely (1980). Also, Nino (1990). 
10 In ‘hyper-presidentialist’ regimes, the executive is given special powers in legislative matters 
(delegation of legislative functions), with regard to local decisions (the power to intervene with local 
governments, replaceing authorities), or even to limit the rights of the people (i.e., by declaring a state of 
emergency). (Nino 1997). 
11 See for example (Schedler et al. 1999). Most modern democracies prefer horizontal over vertical 
controls. Apart from periodic elections most of the institutional mechanisms for controlling the 
representatives through the participation of the public have been suppressed (i.e., mandatory instructions 
and the right to recall). Political mandates have also been extended in their duration (less frequent popular 
elections). Internal controls include ‘political’ accountability mechanisms (the presidential veto, the 
senate’s capacity to prevent/delay the enactment of certain laws) as well as ‘non-political’ ones 
(performed by judges, and other agencies such as human rights commissions, ombudsmen, auditor 
generals, independent central banks etc.). The ‘non-political’ checks are particularly significant in 
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As the last and most fundamental protectors of the democratic process, judges should first 
of all scrutinise self-beneficial norms created by incumbents in order to retain their power 
and/or to weaken the influence of the opposition. Such initiatives have been all too 
common, also in Zambia (such as the constitutional amendments regarding eligibility for 
the presidency, aimed at barring particular candidates from running, and the (unsuccessful) 
attempt to introduce a third term as the rule of the incumbent was nearing an end…)12 We 
also find numerous initiatives aimed at silencing the political opposition, sometimes to the 
point of violently encroaching upon of the power of other branches. 13 To look at election-
related cases are thus particularly interesting. 
 
Secondly, we suggest that the judges should strictly scrutinise all those norms aimed at 
affecting the rights of those groups that, even when they are not actually denied a voice or 
a vote, have particular difficulties in expressing and defending their views. This is 
particularly relevant in new and more fragile democracies, where the level of social 
conflict tends to be higher than in more consolidated regimes, and where the public 
institutions often seem less open to allow the political intervention of disadvantaged 
groups. In those cases, the judges, as ‘referees’ of the democratic game, should ensure that 
the underprivileged obtain the social benefits and the legal protection afforded other groups 
by the political system. 14 
 
From a normative perspective such cases represent opportunities for judicial intervention, 
as they regard the protection of the impaired rights of disadvantaged groups and ‘policing 
the process of political representation.’ On the other hand, it is important that judges know 
when they should remain silent or ‘passive’ (for example when a properly elected group or 
representatives, sanctions norms that the judges find unfortunate, but which are not self-
serving or do not affect the procedural foundations of the democratic system). The 
questions of when and how to engage in judicial activism and when to exercise restraint, 
are particularly important to address for judiciaries in young democracies. It is thus of 
                                                                                                                                               
dominant-party states (common among new democracies) as the only remaining institutional obstacle to 
unlawful use of power by the majority in cases where majority support has rendered political party 
dominant both in the executive and legislative branches of government. 
12Manoeuvres on the part of presidents, aimed at securing re-election or to secure perpetuation in power 
by other means are numerous: Zambia’s ex-president Chiluba bowed off in 2001, but secured re-election 
in 1996 after a constitutional amendment barring ex-president Kaunda from running for office. Several 
other African presidents have attempted to get rid of constitutional provisions banning them from running 
for a third term, including Namibian president Sam Nujoma (who succeeded) .The Malwian president is 
also involved in a bid for a third term. Similarly, in Argentina, ex-president Menem attempted to secure 
re-election by changing the rules. In Peru, ex-president Fujimori attempted to prolong his term by the 
‘autogolpe’ in April 1992.  
13 I.e., by directly shutting down Congress, as it happened in Peru in 1992, or in Zimbabwe, where the 
Chief Justice was forced to resign in 2001 after regime-induced demonstrators invaded and occupied the 
Chambers of the Supreme Court. Less violent means include the so-called ‘mordaza-law’ or ‘gag-rules’ 
promoted by president Menem, in Argentina. In Peru B.I. Bronstein was deprived of his ownership of the 
national TV channel, n.2, because of his opposition to president Fujimori’s regime (Expediente n. 112-98-
AA/TC, April 24, 1998). In many African countries the opposition’s rights are restricted – at present most 
severely and overtly in Zimbabwe, where press freedom is severely restricted and journalists are jailed. 
Prior to the 2001 elections in Zambia there were complaints and court cases brought by the opposition 
over unequal access to the media and the ruling party’s use of state resources for campaigning purposes.  
14 This is not what usually happens, but in South Africa, a number of court cases have brought over access 
to housing, health services, water and other constitutionally protected social and economic rights. 
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great interest to investigate strategies by which the Zambian courts have sought to 
accomplish this balancing act and the extent to which they have succeeded. In order to do 
this we need to develop an analytical framework that is informed by the theoretical and 
normative debates in this field, but at the same time provides for analyses that are 
grounded in the practical conditions of Zambia. 
 
The establishment of a sound benchmark for this analysis requires not only thorough 
reflections on issues of judicial activism/passivism, but also of the related questions 
regarding judicial independence and impartiality. Our focus is primarily on power-
relations that are internal to the political system (horizontal accountability – the capacity of 
courts to say ‘no’ to the executive and make their decision stick) rather than the 
institutionalisation of popular control of those in power (vertical accountability relations). 
While the above discussion shows that there are strong arguments why effective checks on 
executive power by the courts are needed to consolidate modern democracies, there is still 
the question of how strong these internal controls should be. At the normative level there is 
the issue of the un-democratic nature of such institutions.15 At the practical level an 
extensive system of horizontal checks on power incurs costs, both financial and in terms of 
efficient decision-making. There is also the question of how to prevent misuse of the 
power by the judiciary itself. Reflections on what should be seen as an appropriate role for 
the courts also need to take into account issues of judicial accountability (how to guard the 
guardians) as well as the above-mentioned dangers of politicisation. 
Indicators 
Proceeding towards the actual analysis, the next step is to establish suitable indicators. 
 
In order to assess the political role of the courts we need performance indicators. With 
regard to their accountability function vis-à-vis the government, these indicators need to 
take into account the preventive or latent function of the courts (other political actors’ 
anticipation of a likely negative sanction if they overstep) as well as the manifest or 
displayed ability to ‘say no and make it stick’.  
 
When measuring courts’ ability to function as a check on executive authority, a commonly 
used indicator is to look at the number or percentage of cases in which courts decide 
against the state (normally this is restricted to the highest courts in the land). While this is a 
useful starting point, it does not take into account the significance of the decisions, or the 
merits of the cases in question. Meaningful accountability performance measures need to 
place importance on the significance of the ‘blocking events’ rather than their frequency, 
(although the latter also is relevant), and must also consider the substance of the courts’ 
argument in politically significant decisions going either way. It should also be noted that 
it may not be obvious what the significance of a decision is – or whether a formally 
contrary ruling actually does inconvenience the state. It is thus crucial that the analysis is 
based in an in-depth understanding of the broader political situation. 
 
                                                 
15 Un-elected judges nullifying elected representatives’ decisions, give rise to a counter majoritarian 
dilemma. Legalization of politics may cause empty the political sphere, and thus produce a democratic 
deficit. 
  7 
In addition to finding ways to measure the courts' ability to say ‘say no’ to the government 
where this is called for, it is also necessary to have indicators addressing the courts’ 
authority (their ability ‘to make it stick’). To determine government compliance with 
adverse court decisions the political situation must be followed over time. (It is for 
example a common phenomenon that people released from police custody on court orders 
are rearrested shortly after.) It should also be considered whether the state only yields with 
regard to the particular case, or change behaviour patterns (repeatedly) sanctioned by the 
courts, as well as the institutional framework for pursuing claims originating from judicial 
decisions. 
 
To find good observable indicators for the latent authority of the courts is difficult. But 
while it is not easy to observe to what extent other actors are influenced by their 
anticipation of a potential sanction by the courts, it is crucial to find ways to take the 
preventive or directive effect of these institutions into account since this is arguably the 
main mechanism by which courts exercise authority when they are firmly institutionalised. 
One possible path is to look at whether there are administrative processes to check for 
constitutionality in the drafting process of laws and policies in order to prevent adverse 
court decisions. Another path may be to analyse the extent to which issues of 
constitutionality are central in public and parliamentary debate, and whether threats of 
court action (or complaints to other accountability institutions) have a disciplining 
function. Interviews with legal practitioners and others may also shed light on the extent to 
which accountability institutions have such latent authority.  
 
Related to this is the subtler phenomenon of cases not being brought before the judicial 
system because of the latter’s lack of legitimacy among those whose interests the system 
should ideally defend. The state – or the judiciary – might also pursue a strategy of 
‘venting’, i.e. allow certain cases to be tried and decided in favour of the plaintiff in order 
to maintain a lowest practicable threshold of legitimacy internally or in the interaction with 
the international community. The performance indicators are summed up in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the performance indicators, we need indicators on the institutional factors 
that are believed to impact on the courts’ performance. These may be termed indicators of 
structural independence and aim to establish to what extent the institutional set-up and the 
legal framework guiding the operation of the courts is suitable, providing the necessary 
insulation from interference, and capacity and resources to function effectively.  
Table 1. Performance indicators  
a) Displayed judicial independence 
- frequency 
- significance 
b) Manifest judicial authority 
- compliance with court order 
- change of praxis (‘precedence-effect’ of judgments) 
c) Latent judicial authority 
- constitutionality considerations in legislation and policy-debates 
- cases not brought, ‘venting’ 
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An important factor here is the powers and jurisdiction given to the courts, in particular the 
extent of their review powers over legislation and executive action. (Are certain areas, such 
as emergency powers, shielded from review? How does cases reach the court? Can they 
take up cases on their own initiative? Can they review legislation in abstract or only in 
response to a particular case placed before them?) 
 
A number of aspects are relevant here, but generally there are two dimensions: the scope of 
the courts’ authority – the width of the domain where they can hold the government to 
account. The other regards the strength of their decisions – do they have the final say? Or if 
not, how easily can their decisions be overturned (i.e. in a subsequent proceeding at the 
same judicial level)? Particularly in new democracies this relationship tends to be 
relatively fluid – and the extent of the powers of the courts are to a large extent determined 
by the mindset of the judges themselves – what they see as their proper role. Who are the 
central actors on the stage thus becomes a factor of utmost significance – and a central 
factor in determining this is obviously the appointment procedures, and the criteria by 
which the appointees are selected.  
 
The appointment of judge is widely regarded as one of the most important factors 
conditioning their independence – and the extent to which they are perceived by the public 
as independent. This is in turn important for their legitimacy. To lower the risks for 
political bias it is seen as important to avoid a too strong hand for the executive/political 
majority in the appointment of judges. On the other hand, the alternative (give some form 
of veto to the opposition, or leave it to the judicial profession) may also politicise the 
judiciary, creating a bench that is/appear to be unrepresentative or reactionary. A procedure 
involving at least two separate bodies is widely recommended. The extent to which this is 
in place – and effectively involves different interests – is thus important.16  
 
In many countries, for example in Zambia, a special body – a judicial services commission 
or judicial council – is involved in the appointment process. This body is normally 
composed primarily of representatives from the legal profession, sometimes also 
politicians from across the political spectrum. Whether or not there is such a body, the 
nature of its involvement, how politically independent it is, and how transparent it 
operates, is relevant here. It is also relevant to consider the (implicit and explicit) criteria 
determining the selection of judges and the way this is reflected in the composition of the 
bench (in terms of class, gender, race, ethnicity, political background) 
 
Arguably even more important for the independence of judges than their appointment, is 
the terms and conditions of their tenure. If dismissal, promotion or demotion is at the will 
of the executive/political majority, this seriously compromises their independence, 
likewise if their terms are renewable. From the perspective of independence, life tenure, or 
fixed non-renewable terms, and guarantees for salaries and benefits, is favourable. (On the 
other hand it is important to keep in mind the need to balance this against the need for 
appropriate mechanisms to discipline and impeach corrupt and/or incompetent judges). 
 
                                                 
16 The US model (appointment by the executive and ratification by the legislature) is rarely effective in 
contexts were a strong majority party controls both bodies, which is the case in many African countries. 
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The power of the purse is strong, and affects accountability agencies in various ways. If 
accountability agencies depend on the executive for their  budgets this affects their 
effectiveness as well as independence. It is thus important to consider both the adequacy 
and the security of their funds: Whether they have a guaranteed budget, and if not, who 
approves it, how independently the funds are administered, and the extent to which 
additional funding can be secured from donors. 
 
In addition to the financial resources, other ‘assets’ should also be taken into account and 
particularly what may be termed jurisprudential resources. These include training of 
judges; law reports regularly reporting significant judgments; library resources; computers; 
and internet facilities. Access to foreign judgements, not least from other countries in the 
region, may be an important resource for local judges. The indicators of structural 
independence are summed up in table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While structural conditions are important it must be noted that these are neither necessary 
nor sufficient conditions for judicial independence and effective functioning of judiciaries. 
Institutionalisation of courts as accountability institutions (and agents of social 
transformation) also depends on other factors, the personal capacity, will and integrity of 
judges, the nature of the legal culture, the nature of civil society and the political culture in 
society.  
 
Imagine that the Zambian president blatantly contravened the rulings of the Court of 
Appeal and systematically harassed 'troublesome' judges on the bench, like Robert Mugabe 
has done in Zimbabwe – who (if anyone) would come out in support of the judiciary? The 
political opposition? The business community? Ordinary people? The donors? 
 
To be effective, and able to withstand attacks on their authority, courts depend on support 
from politically relevant groups in society. It is thus important in this analysis to seek to 
assess their legitimacy, and develop suitable indicators to identify whether there is 
significant social support for the courts, and how firm this is. Eventually, this could also 
help us to understand better the conditions under which the necessary legitimacy is 
generated, and which strategies are the most promising. 
 
Public opinion polls may give indications of the levels of public support, both regarding 
public awareness and support. It is also important to look at how these bodies are portrayed 
Table 2. Indicators of structural independence  
d) powers and jurisdiction 
- scope of authority 
- strength of decisions 
e) appointment procedures 
- procedures of nomination and appointment 
- bodies involved (judicial council?) 
- background of judges 
f) terms and conditions of tenure 
g) budgets 
h) jurisprudential resources 
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in the media, both the independent media and the government controlled press. Interviews 
with central stakeholders (legal and political academics, civil society activists, the legal 
community, members of various political parties, and of the press, the business 
community, donors) can also provide very useful information. 
 
The courts rely on a working relationship with the government – unless respected by those 
in power their decisions are not implemented. Beyond executive compliance with adverse 
decisions, which is already discussed, government rhetoric  may be an indicator of the 
legitimacy of the accountability institutions with the ruling elite. 
 
In many new democracies the external/foreign support for the courts play an important role 
(and is in some cases stronger than the domestic constituency). How important is this in 
Zambia – and is the effect only positive? Some have argued that donor support may be a 
double-edged sword, making the courts vulnerable to accusations of being agents of 
foreign/neo-colonial forces (Again, the developments in Zimbabwe sound a warning in this 
regard and shows the importance of trying to assess to what extent this donor embrace may 
add to the courts politicisation, compromising their 'home grown' legitimacy.  
 
The perhaps most important factor impacting on how courts operate is, however, judges’ 
perceptions of what their own role should be (conceptions of appropriateness). To their 
conception of what is an appropriate way for them to seek to hold the government to 
account, of how various rights should be handled in court (for example with regards to 
social rights;, and of what is possible. This is in turn related to the legal culture (for 
example with regard to judicial review powers and when it is proper for the courts to defer 
to the parliamentary majority). This can perhaps best be investigated through semi-
structured interviews with judges and members of the legal community, as well as 
representatives of the political community and civil society organisations. Other important 
sources of data will be judgments and other material from significant court cases, the 
formal legal framework, official reports and media statements and debates. 
 
The most important indicators of institutionalisation are listed in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The courts and social inclusion of marginalised groups 
In most countries the courts have not been important arenas for articulating the concerns 
of the poor. The court system is generally not accessible to the poor, due to lack of 
knowledge, high cost, corruption and inadequate legal aid.17 Those who succeed in 
                                                 
 
Table 3. Institutionalisation indicators  
i) perception of own role (legal culture, norms of appropriateness) 
j) legitimacy 
- in political society 
- in civil society 
- international community 
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filing their cases often face delays for years, only to find that their concerns are 
eventually dismissed. Most legal traditions are unaccustomed to handling social rights. 
The recruitment of judges from the elite, leading a life far removed from the plight of 
the poor, also influence the operation of the legal system, which as a whole tends to 
protect vested interests. Public policies aimed at reducing poverty may actually be 
barred through court action, notwithstanding formal constitutional commitments to 
social and economic rights. 
 
There are examples of poor groups/NGOs successfully using court action to assert their 
rights, and of courts consciously promoting the interests of the weakest and most 
vulnerable. The Supreme Court of India has taken a lead in this regard, transforming 
itself into a “Supreme Court for Indians.” It has done so without strong backing for 
social and economic rights in the letter of the constitution. The Indian example has also 
inspired courts in other developing countries, not least in common law Africa, were a 
growing number of judges now  strive to be socially relevant and see their role as 
facilitating social transformation – radical change, but in an orderly fashion, based on 
principles.18  South Africa is an interesting case where the constitution has provided 
both a constitutional basis for social rights cases and created a new Constitutional Court 
with a mandate to make protect these rights. 
 
One of the most interesting cases heard on these matters anywhere, is from South Africa 
and is know as the Grootboom case19. It concerns the right to housing20 and the right of 
children to adequate shelter. The case was brought by a group of families with children 
who had been evicted from a squatter settlement. The South African Constitutional 
Court did not grant individual legal redress from the state based on the plaintiffs’ social 
or economic rights. It ruled that not even for children21 did the constitutional right to 
shelter give rise to an individual claim against the state. However, the court ruled that 
the constitutional obligation of the state to “take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation” of the 
right to housing, had not been sufficiently discharged by the housing authorities. In 
addition to medium- and long-term housing programmes, reasonable schemes for the 
immediate and short term was needed to provide destitute people with rudimentary 
shelter. While the Court found that the constitutional right to housing does not 
constitute a directly enforceable claim on the part of homeless people, its ruling 
established the right to housing as a justiciable right, placing firm legal obligations on 
state policy, and on policy implementation as well as design. 22 
 
                                                 
18 Author's personal communication with senior judges in Tanzania, South Africa. See also Widner, 
Jennifer. A. (2001). Building the Rule of Law, W.W. Norton & Company. 
19 “Grootboom and others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and others”, SACCT 38/00 
20 Section 26 provides that (1) everyone has a right to adequate housing; (2) the state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this 
right; (3) no one may be evicted from their homes, or have their homes demolished, without a court order 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances; and (4) no legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions. 
21 This  refers to children in the care of their families. 
22 In this case an NGO provided high quality legal assistance to the litigants while another NGO, acting as 
a ‘friend of the court’, provided a brief that much of the judgement rested on. 
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Lessons from countries with experience of social interest litigation on behalf of poor 
groups (India, South Africa), as distinct from countries in which the legal system is 
more hostile to the poor, suggest certain key factors. Information and legal literacy on 
the part of the poor and their NGOs representatives seem crucial, in particular 
knowledge of relevant case material and legal reasoning. Lower costs, adequate legal 
aid schemes, less bureaucratic and less costly court procedures, more lenient criteria of 
legal standing, are all factors that would be helpful. Similarly, capable courts, 
adequately equipped, efficient and free from corruption, would greatly enhance the 
prospects for  social rights litigation. 
 
Finally, a very important factor is political will on the part of the government to comply 
with and implement the rulings of the court.23 This is closely linked to the legitimacy of the 
courts – which in turn seems to be linked to the ability of the court to be socially relevant – 
and not least in Africa. 
 
To build a broad legitimacy-base in the population, "win the hearts and the minds of the 
people", is a great challenge for courts everywhere. It is a particularly great challenge after 
a period of authoritarian rule where the courts have been part of the control and punishing 
apparatus of the state. And in parts of the world were the formal legal system to a large 
extent is 'received' from the colonial state, and are not taken to reflect the traditions norms 
of the community. And where state resources are limited, rendering the lower courts in 
particular, under-resourced. How can the courts in a country like Zambia – where to some 
extent all these conditions apply – win broad legitimacy among the poor majority? Clearly 
such confidence builds up/deteriorates over time as a function of the performance of the 
justice system on various dimensions, and the perhaps most important aspect of this is 
whether people believe that they can rely on the courts to have their rights (including their 
social and economic rights) respected (in relation to the government as well as their fellow 
citizens). 
 
The extent to which this is the case, and the people have faith in the courts, can be assessed 
through surveys (data from the Afrobarometer 2000, indicate that Zambians have relatively 
high confidence in their courts compared to other institutions of government) – and their 
actual performance can be assessed by looking at cases involving the rights of 
marginalised groups where they won recognition for their claims. One should however also 
look at the structural and normative factors enabling and preventing the ability of the 
courts to be relevant, accessible and just for poor people, and to be seen as such.  The main 
access to justice barriers are presented in table 4. 
                                                 
23 This problem is sometimes framed as ‘how to create a culture of constitutionalism’ and secure a 
commitment to self-binding, and lies at the heart of the question of how courts can hold decision-makers 
accountable The term self-binding  refers to a particular understanding of how constitutional commitment 
works. It is well set out by Jon Elster (1979), who refers to the myth of Ulysses and the Sirens. Ulysses, 
who knows he will be entranced by the Sirens’ song and prone to steer his ship into disaster, binds 
himself to the mast and orders his crew to keep a steady direction and plugs their ears. In this way he may 
enjoy the wonderful song but still seer clear of the Sirens’ dangerous temptation. Similarly, a constitution, 
as an overriding, long-term commitment made after thorough reflection, should serve as a mechanism of 
restraint on actions and decisions (legislation and policies), in order not to allow short-term temptation 
jeopardise crucial long-term goals. The relevant question here is: what mechanisms can ensure that the 
‘constitutional’ commitment by the donors to reduce poverty is not overridden by the temptations 
represented by domestic businesses, agricultural interests and other sirens. 
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Table 4: Access to justice barriers  
 
k) Resource constraints/ practical barriers for potential litigants 
- Costs of court fees  
- Costs of legal assistance 
- Lack of legal aid 
- Geographical distance (time and transport costs) 
 
l) Mental barriers of litigants 
- Fear 
- Disillusionment, (poor prior experience: delays, corruption, incompetence, bias) 
- Cultural distance ('foreign' legal norms in the formal court system) 
 
m) Resource constraints/ practical barriers in the legal system 
- Slow process, delay, (due to lack of judicial personnel and/or infrastructure: courtrooms,  
paper, phones, PCs, recording equipm., trained support staff) 
- Incompetence (due to poor education, training, lack of access to legal material) 
- Petty corruption encouraged by poor remuneration for (lower court) judges/magistrates  
and police 
 
c) Mental barriers in the legal system 
- Social background of judges (representativity, ability to comprehend) 
- Legal culture, formalism, bureaucratic procedures 
- Executive mindedness 
- Corruption (personal morals, will) 
 
Why is this framework useful? 
There are no quick and easier answers to the problem of how to institutionalise political 
accountability – which also implies respecting the rights of the marginalised sections of 
society. There are high hopes for courts to play a constructive role, and in some cases they 
have done so, but in other cases they have added to the existing problems. What is it that 
determine how the courts function? The tentative answer informing our approach is that 
this can be traced both to the institutional and legal framework of the state and to the way 
this is institutionalised – which in turn depend on economic and cultural factors as well as 
agency. In other words a complex interaction between a number of factors. In order to 
come to grips with these issues at all it is necessary to engage in an analytical approach 
that takes the complexity of the context into account, yet it must have sufficient theoretical 
strength and clarity to structure and make sense of the findings. We hold that thick 
description through qualitative methods of data collection and analysis are necessary to 
understand the processes through which courts (re)define their role, the strategie s by which 
they seek to carve out and secure space for themselves in the political field during and after 
democratic reforms, and their impact on processes of democratic consolidation and 
economic transformation. The advantage of doing this within a set framework is that – by 
doing similar case-studies of courts in other countries, in Africa and elsewhere, it is 
possible to gain a better understanding of how the function of courts is related to 
differences in institutional, political and economic conditions. What we suggest is thus to 
proceed by comparative case studies based on structured thick description. 
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Summary 
 
 
The paper addresses the methodological problems 
concerning how to assess the political role of courts in 
Zambia - and in new democracies more generally, and 
suggests a framework within which this can be done. 
Particular focus is on the accountability function vis -à-vis 
political authorities. We also raise the issue of the role 
courts play (positively or negatively) in processes of social 
integration of marginalised groups. And we ask how we can 
get a better understanding of the conditions under which 
courts generate legitimacy for their role and avoid undue 
politicisation. 
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